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Abstract
S trategy and skills for m oral decision-making in business
Business Ethics is a truly interdisciplinary fie ld  o f  study. The specific issue 
o f moral decision-making within the fie ld  o f  business ethics testifies to this. 
Recently some have made important contributions in this regard -  
contributions in which they emphasised that moral theory is not sufficient 
fo r  moral decision-making. What is needed besides moral theory is 
problem-solving ability. In this article the same point is argued, but from a 
philosophical perspective. It is further indicated that problem-solving 
ability entails more than merely a strategy fo r  making moral decisions. It 
should also include the development o f  the thinking skills which are 
demanded by the strategy chosen fo r  problem resolution.
1. Introduction
That business ethics is a truly interdisciplinary field o f study, is evident from an 
analysis o f the contributors to the academic journals on Business and Professional 
Ethics. It is equally evident that contributors from various disciplines tend to 
approach this interdisciplinary field of study differently. Jones (1982:211) for 
example, made a broad typology of the differences between the concerns o f the 
various disciplines which contribute to the field o f business ethics. He contended 
that theologians seems to be more interested in macro-economic ethical issues 
about the moral legitimacy of economic systems. The academic discipline of 
business management seems to be more focused on the meso-economic issues 
about the interaction between business and society. Philosophers, according to 
this typology, tend to engage themselves more with issues on the micro-economic 
level about the morality o f specific business actions. Participation in the field of 
business ethics has fortunately not been restricted to these three role players. 
Recently contributions by psychologists have become more prominent. The 
issues about moral decision-making raised by psychologists through their 
contributions within the field o f business and professional ethics will be explored 
from a philosophical perspective in this article.
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2. Business ethics and moral decision-making
When philosophers approach the field o f business ethics, their contributions tend 
to be in the form of applied ethics. In this form it applies moral theory to 
practical issues in business. A glimpse at textbooks on business ethics written by 
philosophers testifies to this fact (cf. Olen & Barry 1996; Velasquez 1992; 
Beauchamp & Bowie 1993; Boatright 1993; White 1993). In most cases one 
finds that textbooks start by explaining the content o f classical moral theories. 
Thereafter these theories are applied -  often by means o f a series o f 
contemporary readings -  to topical issues in contemporary business. The 
assumption behind this approach clearly is that moral theories can assist one in 
making decisions about difficult moral issues in business. What most textbooks, 
however, fail to do, is to show how one should move from competing -  and often 
irreconcilable -  moral theories to moral solutions. What is thus evidently lacking 
is the process o f decision-making that should bridge the gap between moral 
theory and practical moral solutions.
Recently this flaw in the philosophical approach to business ethics has been 
exposed by psychologists working in the field of business or professional ethics 
(cf. Gawthrop & Uhlemann 1992; Kavathatzopoulos 1993; Kavathatzopoulos 
1994). They have argued that moral theories on their own are inadequate for 
making moral decisions. What is needed for moral decision-making is a specific 
strategy that can produce practical solutions to moral problems. They have 
further demonstrated that training in moral decision-making strategy is effective 
to secure a transition from heteronomous to autonomous moral decision-making. 
In this respect they have enriched the study o f business ethics by securing greater 
attention for the process o f moral decision-making. Their contribution should 
thus be regarded as a valuable contribution to the ongoing discourse about 
business ethics.
Contributions to discourses always tend to evoke further contributions. This 
article is intended to be a response from a philosophical angle to this specific 
contribution that was made. The response will have two dimensions. On the one 
hand the suspicion that the mentioned psychologists seem to harbour against the 
value of moral theories for moral decision-making will be supported from a 
philosophical perspective. On the other hand, an aspect o f moral decision­
making that seems to be neglected in the mentioned contributions will be attended 
to. That aspect is the thinking skills needed for applying any moral decision­
making strategy.
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3. Moral theory and moral decisions
It has already been stated that philosophical textbooks 011 business ethics seem to 
suggest that moral theories are a good point of departure for making moral 
decisions. This assumption, however, needs further examination.
Ethical theories are theories about the justification o f  moral actions. They 
propose appropriate reasons on which moral decisions should be based. 
Traditionally two major kinds o f moral theories are distinguished, viz. 
deontological and consequensialist theories. Recently more theories were added, 
such as virtue theories and narrative theories. When ethical theories are 
compared, it is evident that there is no consensus on what these alleged 
appropriate reasons are that should ground our moral decisions (MacIntyre, 
1981:5).
Kant, as the classical representative o f deontological theories, contends that we 
should dutifully obey the imperatives for moral behaviour that is evident to all 
rational persons. Mill, representing a specific strand o f consequentialism, argues 
that the amount o f collective happiness rendered by actions should be the basis 
for our moral decisions. Narrative theories, again assert that the symbolic 
universe in which our lives are situated should determine what course o f action 
we should follow in our moral decision-making. And so we can continue listing 
the alleged appropriate reasons which should gird our moral decisions.
Comparing just the three mentioned theories, it is evident that each o f them opted 
for a different criterium for morality. Though none o f these criteria are un- 
controversial, each o f them can be rationally justified. In that sense none o f them 
can be dismissed as nonsensical, but at the same time none o f them can claim 
superiority. Far from pointing out the one and only way toward moral decision­
making, they rather formulate the various reasons that were historically advanced 
to ground moral decisions. There is no neutral referee available to decide which 
moral theory is best. It is exactly for this reason that the contemporary culture is 
described as a culture of moral dissensus.
This phenomenon o f moral dissensus does not imply that moral theories should be 
dismissed as meaningless and in a state o f mess. Moral theories still have value. 
They can help moral agents understand themselves better, in the sense that they 
provide detailed rational explanations for convictions that many people are only 
able to express as gut-feelings. Knowledge o f moral theories can also sensitise 
one for the strengths and weaknesses of particular moral theories. They can 
assist one in becoming more tolerant towards persons who differ from you, 
because one will realise that within our culture o f moral dissensus the moral 
theory that one subscribes to does not enjoy a monopoly status.
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Although moral theories are useful for moral awareness and for understanding 
moral discourse, their usefulness in real decision-making about moral issues in 
business is restricted by various factors, o f which two will be mentioned here:
• Moral dissensus is not only typical o f post-modern culture in general, but also 
o f business and more specifically large corporations. This moral dissensus has 
important implications for moral decision-making on disputes in which more 
than one person or party is involved. If  we assume for the moment that people 
do indeed use moral theories as the basis for their moral decisions, then the 
question inevitably arises what should be done when persons who adhere to 
different moral theories propose conflicting solutions for the dispute. Moral 
theories themselves cannot lead us out o f this impasse, because it has already 
been stated that it is impossible to judge one moral theory superior to another, 
because they are all in principle rationally and morally valid. Something more 
than moral theory is needed to solve this dilemma. What is needed is a 
strategy for moral decision-making and the thinking skills required by that 
strategy. This will be discussed later in this article.
•  A further restriction o f moral theories has to do with their nature. A moral 
theory proposes an abstract and clearly defined rule or principle that should 
guide all our actions. The situations that require moral judgement do not 
display the same features. On the contrary, situations in which we need to 
make moral decisions are concrete, clouded and controversial. They simply 
do not permit moral theories to be applied easily and neatly (cf. Vermaak, 
1995:160). Solving moral dilemmas often demands difficult compromises and 
a creative mixture o f various moral considerations. Moral theories once again 
might prove to be most helpful in understanding and analysing moral 
dilemmas, but they cannot produce solutions to moral problems. More than 
just moral theories are needed to produce practical solutions to moral 
problems.
It is to that “more” that the rest o f this article will attend.
4. Strategy for moral decision-making
It has been argued till now that more than moral theory is needed for making 
moral decisions when faced with moral dilemmas. Psychologists indicated that 
the “more” that is needed is “problem solving ability” (cf. Kavathatzopoulos 
1994:379). What will be explored next, is what “problem solving ability” entails 
as seen from a philosophical perspective. Such a perspective can enrich the 
mentioned psychological contributions to business ethics that seem to be merely 
concerned with facilitating a shift from what Piaget (1932) termed a hetero- 
nomous to an autonomous method o f problem solving. What seems to be 
neglected is the quality o f the decision-making process and the skills needed for
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making high quality decisions. Philosophy, through its tradition of inquiry first in 
logic, later in informal logic and most recently in the critical thinking movement 
(cf. Van Veuren, 1995) can offer perspectives that can contribute towards our 
understanding o f and competency in “problem solving ability” .
Problem solving in any domain always involves two things: strategy and 
execution. Strategy can be described as the plan according to which the problem 
at hand will be solved. Execution again, refers to performing the various steps or 
cognitive operations that the strategy demands for reaching a solution. In this 
section the focus will be on strategy and in the next section on the execution of 
the strategy.
A strategy for moral problem solving should o f course take the limitations of 
moral theories discussed above, as well as the fact o f moral dissensus, into 
consideration. What is thus needed is a strategy for moral decision-making that 
does not rely too heavily on moral theories and that also give due credit to the 
fact o f moral dissensus.
A proposal for a strategy that meets these demands is the RIMS strategy for 
group decision-making that was previously published in Koers (cf. Rossouw, 
1993:283-298; also see Rossouw 1994:53-71). RIMS is an acronym for 
Rational Interaction fo r  M oral Sensitivity. The rationale behind this strategy will 
not be explained fully here, because it has already been done at length in the 
publications just referred to. The basic assumptions underlying the RIMS 
strategy will merely be mentioned briefly. They are the following:
• Firstly, it assumes that moral dissensus is an inescapable fea ture o f  our 
current culture. Modernity, in its attempt to find a secular and rational ground 
for morality, produced various secular and rational grounds for morality. All 
o f these grounds are rationally justifiable and defensible. This resulted in the 
current situation o f dissensus, where none of the competing moral theories can 
succeed in gaining superiority over the others. They therefore need to be 
taken either equally seriously, or all o f them need to be rejected. The first 
option forms the first assumption o f the RIMS strategy.
•  Secondly, it assumes that moral dissensus does not neccesarily result in 
ethical relativism. Moral dissensus only equals ethical relativism, if it is 
assumed that discourse between the rival moral viewpoints has become 
meaningless. This is not the case in the RIMS strategy. It rests on the 
assumption that interaction between rival moral viewpoints is not only 
neccesary, but is also an important source of creativity that can assist all 
involved in finding moral decisions that are more morally sensitive.
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•  Thirdly, it assumes that through dialogue conflicting moral views can be 
creatively harnessed  to produce morally sensitive solutions to moral 
dilemmas. The preconditions for such a dialogue are that the reality o f moral 
dissensus is understood and accepted by all participants in the RIMS strategy, 
and that participants commit themselves to finding a solution amidst the moral 
dissensus. Once this has occurred, the rivalry between moral viewpoints no 
longer frustrates moral decion-making, but becomes a creative resource that 
offers the opportunity o f finding more comprehensive and morally sensitive 
solutions to the problem under discussion than any o f the rival moral 
viewpoints can achieve on its own.
•  Fourthly, it assumes that a fo cu s on the motives underlying moral viewpoints 
cannot solve moral dilemmas in a situation o f  moral dissensus. The argument 
by Alisdair MacIntyre (1981:3-20) that rival moral views can be relayed to 
rival subjective convictions on what constitutes the good, is taken as a valid. 
Once this is granted and moral dissensus is accepted as a reality in current 
culture, it follows that a mere focus on underlying motives cannot solve moral 
problems amidst moral dissensus. At most a focus on moral motives can 
illuminate the various moral view points, but it cannot overcome the rivalry 
between conflicting moral viewpoints. For this reason the RIMS strategy 
advises that motivations underlying moral views should not become the main 
focus point o f the dialogue between participants. The focus should rather be 
on finding solutions that can accommodate the concerns o f all involved.
•  Fifthly, it assumes that proper moral decisions can only be taken on the basis 
o f  balanced and reliable information. This information is provided by 
generating all the moral arguments which participants can identify on the issue 
under discussion. Before such arguments are accepted into the dialogue, 
participants should ensure that everyone involved in the dialogue understands 
the argument and that there is no factually false information included in the 
argument. This o f  course does not mean that all participants should agree with 
an argument before it can be included in the dialogue. It only implies that the 
arguments identified should be recognised as clear moral arguments.
This decision-making strategy can be broken down into three steps. They are:
Step 1: Generate and audit arguments
Any moral argument that satisfies the following three criteria should be taken into
consideration in the decision-making process:
-  The argument should not only take the interests o f the person or party 
presenting it, into consideration, but should also consider the interests o f 
other persons affected by the issue under discussion.
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-  The argument should be clear and intelligible to other persons involved 
in the decision about the issue under discussion.
-  The argument should be factually correct and logically coherent.
Step 2: Identify consequences
Persons involved in the decision-making process should avoid as far as possible 
focusing on one another’s motives or moral presuppositions and should rather 
focus on the positive and negative implications identified by the various 
arguments.
Step 3: Find solutions
Participants should co-operate in finding solutions that will restrict these 
identified negative implications to a minimum, while retaining as far as possible 
the positive concerns identified in the previous step. (For an illustration o f how 
the RIMS strategy can be applied to the moral disputes on affirmative action and 
compulsory AIDS testing respectively, see Rossouw, 1994:72-92 and 93-110.)
The mere application o f a problem-solving strategy, such as the RIMS strategy, to 
a moral dispute does not guarantee that the said strategy will be properly 
executed. In order to apply a strategy such as the RIMS one properly, certain 
cognitive competence is needed -  in other words, one needs the appropriate 
thinking skills that is implied by the strategy. It is exactly this element, viz. the 
teaching o f thinking skills that is needed for applying a strategy for problem 
solving properly, that seems to be neglected in the specific psychological 
contributions on problem solving referred to at the beginning of this article.
In the rest o f the article an indication will be given o f the kind o f thinking skills 
needed for proper problem solving. The RIMS strategy will again be used to 
illustrate what thinking skills are required by such a problem solving strategy. 
Other moral problem solving strategies will o f course require other thinking skills, 
but my contention is that no strategy can be executed properly unless persons 
using those strategies have acquired the thinking skills required by the specific 
strategy they are using. Some remarks about the teaching o f these skills will also 
be ofiered.
5. Thinking skills for moral decision-making
The thinking skills that are required to execute each o f the three steps o f the 
RIMS strategy properly are the following:
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Step 1:
•  Argumentation skills: In order to provide the information on which the 
ultimate decision will be based, the various arguments for and against the 
issue under dispute should be identified. This implies that one should know 
what an argument is and have the ability to formulate arguments. One should 
also be able to identify implied arguments as well as assumptions that have not 
been spelled out explicitly in some arguments.
•  Identification o f  m oral arguments: Moral decisions can only be based on 
moral arguments. It is therefore important that participants should also be able 
to distinguish moral arguments from amoral and immoral arguments. They 
should also be able to identify ego-centric and socio-centric arguments.
• Clarity and coherence: Information is only useful when it is clear and 
intelligible. This implies that arguments should be stated clearly. Key 
concepts in arguments should be well defined in order to eliminate vagueness 
and ambiguity. Arguments should also be formulated in a logically coherent 
way in order to make them clear and understandable to all involved.
•  Intellectual tolerance: In order to give all arguments that meet the three 
criteria spelled out in step one of the RIMS strategy due consideration, 
participants also need intellectual tolerance. If  they lack this virtue they will 
prematurely dismiss arguments that they do not agree with. (Strictly speaking 
intellectual tolerance is a trait o f mind (virtue) rather than a thinking skill, but 
for the purposes o f this paper a broad notion o f thinking skills will be used that 
include virtues as well.)
Step 2:
•  Distinguish motives from  arguments: The RIMS strategy demands that 
motives should be avoided as far as possible. In order to avoid dwelling on 
motives, participants should o f course be able to separate an argument from 
the motives underlying the argument. Participants should also be able to 
exercise meta-cognitive control in order to avoid straying into motives.
•  Identify implications: The RIMS strategy further demands that the focus 
should be on the implications or concerns identified through the various 
arguments. The skill that is needed here, is the ability to identify the 
consequences or concerns of each o f the arguments presented in the dialogue. 
When the implication(s) o f an argument is not spelled out explicitly 
participants should also have the ability to formulate implied implications. 
Furthermore participants should also have the ability to distinguish positive 
concerns from negative ones.
26 Koers 62(1) 1997:19-28
G.J. Rossouw
Step 3:
•  M aking compromises: Participants need to find a way out o f the impasse 
created by conflicting viewpoints presented by moral arguments for and 
against the issue under discussion. In order to do that they need the ability to 
find positions that will minimise the negative consequences/concerns 
identified, while at the same time retaining the positive consequences/concerns 
that have been identified.
• Creative thinking skills: The fact that there is a moral dispute, suggests that 
existing approaches or proposals are not effective in solving the dispute. 
There is thus a need for finding new ways o f dealing with the issue at hand. 
This implies a need for creative thinking skills. Various techniques to 
stimulate innovation can be utilised in this regard, such as brainstorming, 
opposites, visualisation, and forced association to name but a few.
Each o f these skills can and should be taught. If  only decision-making strategy is 
taught, participants in the decision-making process will only learn how to make 
decisions and not how to make them properly. Teaching them the thinking skills 
that a specific strategy demands, enables them to make their moral decisions 
properly. This is not only true for the RIMS strategy but for all other decision­
making strategies. Each strategy demands specific thinking skills in order to 
apply the strategy properly and thus to render a high quality result.
The teaching o f thinking skills is a many faceted endeavour in which not only 
thinking skills should be addressed, but also matters such as the motivation to 
develop thinking skills, the virtues demanded for independent and innovative 
thinking, and factors that enable or disable one’s ability to think properly (cf. 
Rossouw & Lamprecht, 1995). It is impossible to cover these matters in this 
paper. Fortunately an abundance o f literature available on these matters exists 
(like Paul, 1993, Collins & Mangieri, 1992). Just as the field of business ethics 
offers opportunities for participation to many disciplines, so does the teaching of 
thinking skills for moral decision-making as well.
6. Conclusion
In reaction to contributions made by specific psychologists to the field of business 
ethics, and more specifically to moral decision-making in business ethics, two 
main arguments were raised in this article. Firstly, their claim that moral 
decision-making requires more than moral theories, was supported from a 
philosophical angle. Secondly, a certain dimension, essential to the execution of 
any moral decision-making strategy that seems to be neglected in the mentioned 
contributions, have been identified: the thinking skills which are required for the 
proper execution o f a moral decision-making strategy. It was then illustrated
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what those thinking skills entail by using the RIMS strategy for moral decision­
making as an example.
Although not an explicit objective o f this article, it is also hoped that the article 
contibuted towards an understanding and appreciation o f  the importance and need 
o f interdisciplinary work in the field o f  business ethics.
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